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Mortgage Pricing: What Have We Learned So Far?
ABSTRACT
Much progress has been achieved in the valuation of call options and
interest—rate caps on default—free mortgages. The evidencesuggests that the
observed term structure of interest rates (the full structure, notjust the end
points) and a reasonable estimate of the volatility of spot rates is sufficient
for pricing purposes. Knowledge of the precise nature of the interest—rate
process and the exact market price of interest—rate risk, the not—well—
identified determinants of the term structure, are notnecessary for pricing.
(The analogy to pricing stock options is striking; there, knowledge of the
observed stock price ——andthe present value of expected future dividends ——
anda reasonable estimate of the volatility of the stock price are sufficient
to price the option.) Moreover, the number of interest—rate state variables is
also of little import, again holding the term structure and ratevolatility constant.
Pricing the mortgage default option, in contrast, is still in the
embryonic stage. The stochastic process analogous to the interest—rateprocess
in valuing call is a house price process: if a house price declines
sufficiently, default occurs. The observed house price, the present value of
expected future "dividends" (rents), and the volatility of house prices is, in
principle, sufficient to value default (again note the analogy to stock price
options). Unfortunately, rents are unknown, and no observable term—structure
of expected future house—price inflation—rates exists from which toglean the
division of expected housing returns between "dividends" andexpected capital
gains. Also, a series on the recent volatility of individual houseprices is
not readily available. Finally, measurement of the costs to defaultersand the
losses of lenders/insurers when default occurs is far lessstraight—forward
than is the case when call occurs or interest—ratecaps are reached.(Here, an
analogy can be drawn to the difficulties encountered in pricing thebankruptcy risk of firms.)
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Mortgage pricing is a rather dry subject. Considerably juicier is what
is happening to the prices of our former mortgage—pricingcolleagues. We have
Ken Thygerson and Kevin Villani, the duo who used to organize AREUEAprograms
and write about the call option in mortgage contracts, firstrunning Freddie
Mac and now buying up real—estate on the Pacific Ocean in SanDiego. Filling
Kevin's shoes at Freddie Mac are two more of our mortgagepricing colleagues:
Henry Cassidy, new Vice President for Finance and former tennispro at the Bank
Board, and Mike Lea, new Chief Economist and former teacher of consumer
economics at Cornell. And let's not forget Jerry Hartzog, another dabblerat
the Bank Board, who went on to be Treasurer at the FHLB of SanFrancisco and,
more recently, Vice President at Salomon Brothers. Ofcourse, prices are even
better for former finance professors who design optionsstrategies for a broad
range of financial instruments, as I'm sure Fischer Black, Richard Roll, Jess
Yawitz and many others can tell us. But then, whoreally wants to be in coat
and tie at seven o'clock every morning? And who wants togive up his leisurely
summer on the golf course or tennis court and his quiet holidayseason with his
family?
Without megabucks, but with loosened tie, I now turn to themore serious
subject of what we know about pricing mortgages. I'll start out witha quick
review of some methodological issues and then discussmortgages with fixed and
adjustable rates. Throughout, I will be referring to default—freemortgages.
While we are learning about default ——howcan we not help but do so when—2--
default rates are quadrupling? ——weare still far from being able to price
default risk accurately. I will have a few words on this subject in my
conclusion.
I. The Basics of Mortgage Pricing
Substantial similarity exists between fixed—rate mortgages (FRMs) and
adjustable—rate mortgages (ARMs) with interest rate caps and floors. Lenders
will earn below—market returns on both instruments if interest rates should
rise far more sharply than expected. Moreover, rate floors on ARMs and costly
call of FRMs will cause lenders to earn above—market rates of return on both
instruments should interest rates decline somewhat more than expected. Because
of these similarities, the fundamental determinants of the spreads between
coupon rates on par—value FRMs or ARMs and the short—term market rate of
interest are the same.
This mortgage coupon mark—up is largely determined by the slope of the
term structure of interest rates and the longer—run volatility in short—term
rates. The more upward sloping is the term structure ——themore lenders
expect interest rates to rise and the more lenders are averse to increases in
rates ——thegreater will be the mark—up on fixed or capped rate loans.
Moreover, even if the term structure is relatively flat, high long—run
volatility in short rates (high short—term volatility and little mean
reversion) means a reasonable likelihood of significantly higher interest rates
during some future periods. Thus the higher is long—run rate volatility, the
greater is the mark—up.
-
Settinglooser rate caps on ARMs and introducing ARM rate floors and/or
costly call modifies the relationship between the mark—up and its determinants.
The looser are the rate caps and the more costly is call or prepayment, the
less the mark—up will be for a given slope of the term structure and level of
long—run rate volatility. With loose caps, lenders lose less relative to—3—
market rates when rates rise; with costly call and/or rate floors, lenders
gain relative to market rates when rates decline. How much the mark—up is
reduced again varies with the slope of the term structure and the long—run
volatility in rates. Pricing mortgages, then, depends crucially on the
assumptions made regarding possible future interest—rate paths, as well as on
the terms of the mortgage contract.
A. Modelling Interest Rates
In general, the interest—rate process is modelled in continuous time asa
diffusion process about an expected drift over time. More formally, thechange
in the spot rate, dr, is the sum of a time drift term and a diffusion term:
a dr =k(u—r)dt+ordz, (1)
where u is the value toward which the spot rate is reverting, with k being the
speed of reversion, or5 is the standard deviation of the spot rate (a and
are constants) and dz is a standardized Gauss—Weiner process (dz has
independent increments that are normally distributed with a mean of zero and
variance of dt). The dependency of the standard deviation on the level of
interest rates prevents negative interest rates from occurring;an a less than
unity or k greater than zero prevents rates from exploding. For a given
specification of u (such as the long—term Treasury rate) and a (usuallyor
unity), values of k and a can be obtained by the estimation of
ru_r1+OE r r t t—l t—l—4—
where is a random error and the equation standard error equals a (Brennan
and Schwartz, 1982; Buser and Hendershott, 1984). The estimates researchers
obtain for mortgage mark—ups will depend crucially on the assumptions made
about the drift (Uandk) and volatility (are) of interest rates.
The current spot rate, r, is known at any point in time that one wishes
to price mortgages, but the mean—reverting value, u, is not. The natural
method of choosing u is to select a value consistent with the existing term
structure of interest rates (Buser, Hendershott and Sanders, 1985). If fixed—
rate mortgages are being priced, one might select the u that prices eight—year
Treasuries correctly; if one—year adjustable rate mortgages are being priced,
the u that prices one or two year Treasuries accurately might be chosen.
An alternative to working with this general diffusion process is to price
directly off the yield curve (Crane and Lea, 1985). To illustrate, the one—
period yield one period out, r1, is expressed as the forward rate implied by
the term structure, y1, plus a random error, cc
r1 =y1
+cc1,
where a is again chosen to reflect the expected volatility in interest rates.





The k term allows earlier random errors to have a persistent role over time.
With k =0,strong reversion to the implied yield curve exists; assumed spot





r =+ oE k'Eti. (2)
That is, past errors also shift expected future spot rates from the value
implied by the current yield curve.
B. Pricing Models
Using the interest—rate process given in (1) ,with= and a zero—
arbitrage risk/return condition, one can derive [Merton (1973)]
V +[k+k(u—r) +aXr]V+ C—rV=0, (3) t 0 1 r rr
where V is the value function, the subcripts on V denote partial derivatives
with respect to time and the spot rate, Ar½ is the market price of interest—
rate risk and C is the instantaneous cash flow on the mortgage (amortization
plus interest). Solution to this equation (subject to boundary values at
extremely high and low interest rates and to the terms of the mortgage contract
determining C) yields the equilibrium price path of the mortgage. By trial and
error, one can compute the coupon on the mortgage necessary for the mortgage to
be initially valued at par (see below for more details)
An alternative solution is obtained by using the Monte Carlo forward—
solving method. One begins with the large array of possible interest rate
scenarios (say k, which may be in the thousands) obtained from the yieldcurve
as described above, each with its own probability of occurring. The present
value of the mortgage payments in the kth scenerio, whereCASH(r +m)is the
tth anticipated cash flow (scheduled and early payments) and dependson the—6—
coupon mark—up m over the initial spot rate, is
N
CASH (r + m) k to = (4)
t—l II(l+r)
j=O
The mark—up is then computed as that which will equate a weighted average of
the present values in the different scenarios to par
kpk =PAR=v, (5)
where the p's are the probabilities of the scenarios occurring if there is zero
risk aversion (x= 0) and are the pseudo probabilities if aversion exists (Cox,
Ross and Rubinstein, 1979).(Alternatively, one can calculate the present
value of the mortgage payments, assuming no mark—up, for each interest rate
scenario, average these, and then compute the mark—up that will raise this
present value to par.)
The forward—solving model will provide incorrect results if (1)
termination of the contract depends importantly on future values of the state-.
variable ——thespot rate of interest in our case ——and(2) if the current
value of the contract depends importantly on when the contract might be
terminated. This problem explains why the forward—solving model is popular in
valuing ARMs but not FRMS. In the absence of rate floors, the call option on a
short—term ARM has little value to the borrower and thus will cost the lender a
negligible amount. All the borrower achieves by calling is a lower life—of—
loan rate cap. A three percentage point decline in the ARM index, for example,
converts what was originally a five—point life—of—loan cap to an eight—point
cap. Because the gain from lowering the cap from eight to five is so small—7—
relative to the cost of refinancing, call is unlikely. Thus a forward—solving
valuation of rate caps only would lead to a minor understatement, at most, of
the margin needed on short—term ARMs without floors.
As ARMs become longer term and rate floors are introduced, the instrument
becomes more like a FRM and the call value grows larger relative to thecap
value. To make the point clear, consider a fixed—rate mortgage. Use of the
Monte Carlo forward—solving method would probably cause one to choose thenew—
issue mortgage rate as the interest—rate state variable. If call iscostless,
then refinancing will occur whenever the mortgage rate falls below the initial
rate. However, if refinancing costs exist ——originationfees, prepayment
penalties, or simply an upfront charge for the call option ——difficulties
arise. Say that the mortgage rate must fall by two percentage points for call
to be marginally profitable. Will call occur if the rate falls by two anda
half points? Not necessarily. The borrower will gain from therefinancing,
but he gives up a valuable call option in the process (Siegel, 1984).Ifthe
borrower did not call and interest rates were to fall by another two points,
the borrower could then get a full 4½ point reduction in rate ——whichincludes
a pure gain of 2½ points over the 2 points needed to offset refinancing costs
——incontrast to a half point pure gain if earlier refinancing had occurred.
In this case, one cannot accurately evaluate future events withoutknowing the
likelihood of events even beyond.(The same problem exists in using forward—
solving models to price default risk: one cannot evaluate default
probabilities in future periods without knowing the value of the unused default
option, which depends on events even beyond.)
This problem can be finessed by reversing the direction from which the
problem is attacked, i.e., by starting at the end of the contract, where the
call option is known to be worthless, and working backward in time. For the
partial differential equation (3) ,onestarts with a feasible array of, say, 50
spot rates at the end of the life of the fixed—rate contract and evaluates the—8—
known final payment at each of these rates. One then computes the contract
values one period back in time for each of the same spot rates, solving the
differential equation using the "implicit—difference method" (Brennan and
Schwartz, 1977) and the boundary values at the interest—rate extremes.
One of the low interest rate boundary values for a callable mortgage is
the remaining book value of the mortgage plus the prepayment or refinancing
penalty; call or prepayment occurs when the interest rate falls sufficiently
for the contract to rise to this value. Should this value be reached, it
replaces the original solution value. One progresses in this way back to the
initial period. The mortgage value in the initial period at the spot rate
known to exist at that time is the final solution. If this value differs from
par, the mortgage contract can be altered (the C in equation 3) and the
procedure repeated. (While the backward—solving can also be used in the Monte
Carlo method, the calculations became exceedingly tedius. In effect, a
different PAY stream must be pre—specified for every interest rate scenario.)
While the backward—solving method is ideal for fixed—rate mortgages,
problems arise when it is applied to pricing different tranches of
collateralized mortgage obligations or adjustable—rate mortgages with caps
because the contract cash flows on these instruments depend on the unknown path
of spot rates in earlier periods (the reverse of the problem of forward—solving
when termination depends on the unknown path of interest rates in later
periods). With an ARM life—of—loan rate cap, the problem is minor; only the
amortization is unknown, given today's spot rate, and the valuation is
insensitive to amortization extremes (linear being the most rapid and that with
the coupon at the life—of—loan cap being the least: Buser, Hendershott and
Sanders, 1985) .Withadjustment period rate caps or CMOs, neither forward nor
backward solving is adequate. The solution to this dilemma is iteration—9--
between backward and forward solving solutions. This is achieved by the
introduction of a second state—variable to keep track of the sample path of
interest rates (Dale—Johnson and Langetieg, 1984, and Kau et al, 1985).
A major difficulty in these pricing methods is their complexity. Not
only are the models difficult for researchers to implement (setting the
boundary conditions is the most difficult task), but the output of the models
is nearly impossible for users to verify. All researchers in this area must be
extremely careful in documenting their work and should design experiments to
check their calculations against known analytical solutions. Alternatively (or
supplementarily) they might use both the differential—equation and Monte Carlo
methods to price the same mortgage. Moreover, they should devote some effort
to verification of the results of others. This is no trivial matter. My
collaborators and I have attempted to verify the results of five studies and
have been fully successful only once. I shall return to this point below.
II. Evidence on the Value of the Call Premium in FRMs
Dunn and McConnell (l98la, l981b) were the first to apply the backward—
solving model to fixed—rate default—free mortgages.(Asay, 1978, applied the
model to value the default option in fixed—rate mortgages.) They illustrated
how the methodology developed by Brennan and Schwartz (1977) for nonamortizing
bonds could be applied to amortizing 30—year mortgages and showed the general
implications of amortization. Buser and Hendershott (1984) examined the
sensitivity of the simulated call values to the assumed parameters and valued
15—year level—payment mortgages and 30—year graduated—payment mortgages, as
well as the standard 30—year level—payment mortgages. In a recent issue of
AREUEA, Brennan and Schwartz (1985) ,thepioneers of the application of
numerical methods to the pricing of debt instruments, turned their attention to
pricing FRMs. They employed their two—state interest—rate model (both the—10—
short—term rate and the mean—reverting value are uncertain) ,whichthey contend
leads to substantially more accurate pricing, to obtain realistic estimates of
the call value on 30—year FRMs.
Unfortunately, the Buser and I-Iendershott paper contained an error, and we
have been unable to reproduce the Brennan and Schwartz results (we did
reproduce the Dunn—McConnell results) .Thus,my- collaborators and I have
resimulated call values on par value 30—year FRM5. Realistic values of the
call premium were obtained for both the 1970s and the early l980s for different
slopes of the yield curve. For the l970s, the spread over the spot rate at
time of issue ranged from 90 basis points (negatively sloped yield curve) to
350 basis points (steeply positively sloped yield curve) -Forthe 1980s, the
range was 20 to 30 percent greater. The higher values in the 1980s are due to
a larger volatility in interest rates, although this is partially offset by a
faster reversion of the spot rate to its mean—reverting value.
The call premium on FRMs is usually reported as the difference between
the mortgage coupon and the coupon on a noncallable mortgage with the same
amortization schedule as the callable mortgage, not the difference between the
mortgage coupon and the spot rate. In the l980s, the spread over the
noncallable mortgage coupon is roughly 275 basis points when the yield curve is
downward sloping (and call is likely), but just under 100 basis points when the
yield curve is steeply upward sloping (and call is unlikely). In the 1970s,
call premia were less; about 200 basis points for the negatively—sloped yield
curve and only 50 to 75 basis points for the steeply upward—sloping yield
curve. (Hall's estimates, 1985, are generally consistent with these values,
but precise comparisons are not possible because he did not compute his
estimates for specific yield curves.)
These calculations suggest an enormous swing in the call premia over the
past decade. In 1976—77 and again 1983—84, a 250 basis point positively sloped
yield curve prevailed. In contrast, in late 1979—early 1980 and again in much—"-
of1981 a negative slope of over 100 basis points existed. Thus the call
premia, by our calculations, should have risen from 60 basis points in 1976—77
to over 250 basis points in the early 1980s and then declined to under 100
basis points. Observed spreads between par—value GNMAcoupons and comparable
maturity portfolios of noncallable Treasuries have moved in roughly this manner
(Hendershott, Shilling and Villani, 1983)
Cassidy (1983) and Dietrich et al (1983) estimated the value of a partial
offset to the call option ——theforced prepayment of the mortgage when the
house is sold. Cassidy, using a forward pricing Monte Carlo simulation,
computed the option to be worth 30 to 80 basis points, i.e., elimination of the
due—on—sale option of lenders would raise coupons rates on nonassumable
mortgages by that amount. Dietrich et al, solving the partial differential
equation backwards, reported somewhat higher estimates, 50 to 100 basis points.
Intuitively, these values seem too high. First, unlike the call option,
the due—of—sale option is likely to be exercised relatively late in the lifeof
the mortgage and thus is worth relatively less in present value terms.
(Hendershott, Hu and Villani provide an example in which the value of
assumability is worth only a quarter as much as the value of call, 1983,pp
139—141.) Second, due—on—sale can be exercised only if householdsactually
sell their houses and many will expressly avoid selling in order to maintaina
far below—market mortgage (Hendershott and Hu, 1982). Thusone might expect
due of sale to be worth not more than a fifth as much as the calloption. With
call being worth 100 to 250 basis points, due—on—sale should be worth 20to 50
basis points at most.
A final methodological point. All of the cited studies using thepartial
differential equation method employed a single—state variableexcept Brennan
and Schwartz (and Asay) .Thelatter argue that a second state—variable is
necessary for pricing default—free contingent claims. However, our results—12—
(Buser, Hendershott and Sanders, 1986) show that the second—state variable has
a negligible impact on mortgage prices, again as long as the term structure and
interest rate volatility are held constant.
III. ARM Margins
Given the only recent popularity of ARMs, the volume of research of their
pricing has been enormous. The published work, and it is only the tip of the
iceburg, includes both forward—pricing Monte Carlo analyses by Asay (1984) and
Lea (1985) and backward—pricing calculations by Buser, Hendershott and Sanders
(1985) and Kau et al (1985). Not only do the studies use different pricing
methods, but they assume different interest—rate processes and variances,
different slopes of the term structure, and even slightly different instruments
(one—month versus one year, callable versus noncallable) .Thuscomparisons of
results is difficult. Nonetheless, I have "reproduced" in Table 1 the implied
values of a five percent life—of—loan rate cap for different slopes of the term
structure (approximately the same across the studies) as a means of
illustrating the general nature of the results.(The slope refers to the
spread between yields on par—value 30—year and 3—month Treasuries.)
In spite of the substantial differences in assumed interest—rate
processes, the two BHS studies compute roughly the same cap values: under 10
basis points with the negatively—sloped yield curve and thus expectations of
declining future rates, about a third of a percentage point for the normal
upward sloping yield curve, and three—quarters to a full percentage point with
a steeply upward sloping yield curve and expectations of sharply higher future
rates. This illustrates a general point, namely that knowing the yield curve
and the approximate variance of spot rates is sufficient to price alternative
mortgage features. The Kau et al values are roughly comparable for upward—
sloping yield curves, but their cap value for a negatively sloped yield curve
(rates expected to decline) is sharply higher, nearly double their estimate—13—
when the yield curve has the normal gently rising upward slope (this anomoly
exists for all the ARM contracts they analyze). We have attempted,
unsuccessfully, to reproduce their results; values (listed in parentheses
beneath their values in the Table) based on our interpretation of their
parameterization show the expected pattern of increasing cap values as
expectations of falling interest rates switch to expectations of rising rates.
The forward—pricing Monte—Carlo analyses are not available for all the
different term structures. For the normal yield curve, Asay's 40 basis point
estimate is roughly comparable to the BHS estimates, and Lea's estimates, like
those of BHS, roughly triple as the yield curve rotates from normal to steeply
upward sloping. However, Lea's estimates are only about half as large as BHS,
possibly reflecting a lower assumed variance (Lea does not state his assumed
value) .Thelast row in the table reports the minimum, average, and maximum
margins lenders would have needed to have earned the market rate of return on
hypothetical ARMs with a 5 percentage point life—of—loan cap issued in the
years 1970 through 1976. Interestingly, these ex post values correspond
roughly to the ex ante values for the negative, normal, and steeply positive
term structures.
IV. Conclusions
Much progress has been achieved in the valuation of call options and
interest—rate caps on default—free mortgages. The evidence suggests that the
observed term structure of interest rates (the full structure, not just the end
points) and a reasonable estimate of the volatility of spot rates is sufficient
for pricing purposes. Knowledge of the precise nature of the interest—rate
process and the exact market price of interest—rate risk, the not—well—
identified determinants of the term structure, are notnecessary for pricing.
(The analogy to pricing stock options is striking; there, knowledge of the
observed stock price ——andthe present value of expected future dividends ——
anda reasonable estimate of the volatility of the stock price are—14—
sufficient to price the option.) Moreover, the number of interest—rate state
variables is also of little import, again holding the term structure and rate
volatility constant.
Pricing the mortgage default option, in contrast, is still in the
embryonic stage. While our understanding of default has increased greatly in
recent years (see Van Order, 1985, for a discussion and references) ,our
pricing has not progressed far beyond Asay's original piece. The stochastic
process analogous to the interest—rate process in valuing call is a house price
process: if a house price declines sufficiently, default occurs. The observed
house price, the present value of expected future "dividends" (rents), and the
volatility of house prices is, in principle, sufficient to value default (again
note the analogy to stock price options) .Unfortunately,rents are unknown,
and no observable term—structure of expected future house—price inflation—rates
exists from which to glean the division of expected housing returns between
"dividends" and expected capital gains. Also, a series on the recent
volatility of individual house prices is not readily available. Finally,
measurement of the costs to defaulters and the losses of lenders/insurers when
default occurs is far less straight—forward than is the case when call occurs
or interest—rate caps are reached.(Here, an analogy can be drawn to the
difficulties encountered in pricing the bankruptcy risk of firms.)—15—
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Table 1: Value of a 5 Percent Life—of—Loan Rate Cap
(basis points)
Slope of Term Structure —100 100 300
BHS (1985) 8 26 80
BHS (revised) 6 32 98
KKME (1985)* 58 32 83
(25) (40) (62)
Asay (1984) 40
Lea (1985) 12 44
Hendershott-
Shilling (1985)** 0 28 80
*The numbers in parenthesis are an attempt to reproduce the KKNE results. The
specific term structures computed for these three points are —82, 51 and 187
basis points.
**These values correspond to the minimum, average, and maximum margins that
would have been needed for lenders to have earned a market rate—of—return on
hypothetical ARNs with a 5 percentage point life—of—loan cap issued in the
years 1970 through 1976.